‘Fascists’ in saffron robes? The rise of Sri Lanka’s Buddhist ultra-nationalists


An article appears on CNN by Tim Hume called ‘Fascists’ in saffron robes? The rise of Sri Lanka’s Buddhist ultra-nationalists. Using the same footage of hate speech I used previously of Bodu Bala Sena general secretary Ven. Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara the article observes:

‘Then, his arm raised and his voice rising to a shriek, he issues an explicit threat to Muslims, using a derogatory term for the minority.

To roars of approval, he vows that if any Muslim, were to lay a hand on a Sinhalese – let alone a monk – that would “be the end” of all of them.

What is striking about the clip, aside from the viciousness of the rhetoric, is that the firebrand behind the microphone is dressed in the saffron robes of a Buddhist monk.

He is Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara, the Buddhist holy man who is the general secretary and public face of the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS, also known as Buddhist Power Force).

The ultra-nationalist Sinhalese Buddhist organization has emerged as a troubling presence on the Sri Lankan political landscape in recent years, and is blamed by many for inciting the deadly violence in Aluthgama.’


Riots between Buddhists and Muslims in Mandalay


As  reported in the Democratic Voice of Burma and other news outlets riots have broken out in Mandalay between Buddhists and Muslims. They originated in a blog post by a blogger called Ko Di, a US resident who blogs with the name Thit Htoo Lwin:

‘The violence kicked off after a blogger, who writes under the name Thit Htoo Lwin (the Thit Htoo Lwin Blog), posted an article on 30 June accusing two Muslim owners of the Sun Teashop of raping a Buddhist woman, who he said was their maid…The story was picked up by several websites, and nationalist monk Wirathu posted it to his Facebook page.’ It has been reported that the wife of one of the accused Muslim men has said that they do not in fact have a maid. Whatever the facts behind the story, tensions are clearly high, rumours spread quickly on social media, and U Wirathu appears to have help spread the story on his very popular Facebook page.

The story itself originally appeared under the title ‘Sun Teashop owners, two Muslim brothers, raped a Buddhist maid’. The website is popular with Burmese and it seems that the story was completely fabricated. However, it quickly spread through social media. It is reported that Buddhist monks attempted to calm the rioting Buddhist crowd. Galoneni Sayadaw is reported to have said:

‘We tried our best, but they would not listen. Some of them were drunk and hard to control. Whatever happens to them depends only on their own behavior. We just don’t want to see Mandalay burn because of racial and religious hatred.’

It was reported on 2nd July that the the original blog post on the Thit Htoo Lwin Blog was taken down without explanation.

From M-Media:

‘It was not the first time of posting such fabricated news at Thit Htoo Lwin and it used to blog religious and racial hatred made-up stories and news, which might lead a sectarian conflict. For instance, on 18th Jun 2013, it posted fabricated false news, “Declaration of 2nd Jihad”, with a very clear intention of causing a sectarian conflict.

The founding blogger of the Thit Htoo Lwin Blog is believed to be living in the United States currently. He worked for several foreign-based Burmese Language broadcasts such as BBC, VOA, DVB from 1998 to 2006 according to Irrawady News Magazine’s interview with him.’

A great post has appeared on this entire episode by Kenneth Wong ‘Mandalay: From Mouse Clicks to Mob Rule in 24 Hours’

Socially Engaged Buddhism


To act politically is clearly to involve oneself in the world – at the most basic level it is to make a choice, to take a position, to change the world for the betterment of those who live within society. One of the dilemmas faced by the proponent of Buddhist social engagement is the seeming reluctance of the Buddha to make pronouncements about social change. But, it goes deeper than this. There is not only a reluctance but a very real philosophical necessity to remain distant from strategies of social change and distinct from political involvement. I discuss here part of this philosophical necessity.


The Pali Aṭṭhakavagga’s insists that one should not depend upon apperception (saññā), knowledge (ñāṇa), views (diṭṭhi), on what is seen (diṭṭha), heard(suta), or thought (muta), or on precepts and vows (sīlabbata).[1] This is consistent with the four primary Nikāyas. The Aṭṭhakavagga teaches that purity is not by means of views, learning, knowledge or precepts and vows, nor is it by absence of these. The Mahāviyuha-sutta (Sn 895-914) speaks of giving up all precepts and vows and action both blameable and blameless.[2] This suggests a ‘teaching’ a dhamma of non-involvement – not showing preference for what is seen and heard.[3] Preference or choice (cetanā) is involvement in ‘action’ (kamma), in the round of endless existences pervaded by suffering (saṃsāra, Sn 901).


In the Suribheda-sutta (Sn 848-861) the question is asked, ‘having what vision and precepts is one called “calmed”’?[4] The answer is that it is not to be dependent,[5] not to prefer (purekkhataṃ), not having attachment, and not going astray among dhammas.[6]Knowledge or right-view is an insight into the nature of reality that leads to calm.[7]


Dependence on what is seen, heard, thought and cognized is a familiar basis for wrong-views in the Nikāyas. The diṭṭhi-saṃyutta explains how views arise due to attachment to whatever is seen, heard, thought, cognized, attained, sought after, and ranged over by the mind.[8]It is also explained in the Alagaddūpama-sutta that to regard the ‘aggregates’ (khandhas)[9] or what is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, attained, sought after, and ranged over by the mind as: ‘This is mine, this I am, this is my self’[10] is a basis for view (diṭṭhiṭṭhānaṃ). Without attachment and doubt concerning these things, wrong-view does not arise.[11] This constitutes stream-attainment, when all views are abandoned.[12]


To argue, as some have, that the relinquishment of attachment to what is seen, heard, thought and cognized is an isolated teaching in the Nikāyas, is perhaps to overlook the prominence of passages condemning such attitudes.[13] The Nikāyas suggest consistently and often that attachment to the ‘aggregates’ (khandhas) is the cause of wrong-views, and this, I contend, is the same as stating that one should not be attached to what is seen, heard, thought or cognized. This way of seeing, the detached way expressive of right-view, is described in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi as the unincluded (apariyāpannā) explained as ‘neither the issue of attachment nor favourable to it’.[14] This attitude of non-attachment is at least comparable to that described in the Aṭṭhakavagga as non-attachment from what is seen, heard or thought, from any view, apperception (saññā),[15]contact (phassa), or even dependence on knowledge (ñāṇa, Sn 800).[16] Just as the stream-attainer, one who has achieved right-view, is described as having no dependence upon any act of cognition, so the Aṭṭhakavagga advises the eradication of all attachment to views, apperceptions and knowledge. The sage of the Aṭṭhakavagga ‘does not believe in any view at all’,[17] but then nor does the stream-attainer of the Nikāyas. I suggest that the Nikāyas and the Aṭṭhakavagga describe the same cognitive attitude toward views, wrong or right. The Aṭṭhakavagga verses positing non-attachment from what is seen and heard are consistent with the Nikāyas in which the dhamma is a raft to which one should not become attached, and with the Abhidhamma description of sammā-diṭṭhi as paññā. If we wish to find teachings similar to the Aṭṭhakavagga in the Nikāyas, then we must be clear about the Nikāyas understanding of what constitutes right-view. I am arguing that right-view is not depending on (upādāya), not being attached to, or craving, the khandhas. It is non-dependence on knowledge and views. The Abhidhamma explains how attachment to insight and practice can cause unwholesome dhammas to arise. This is described in the Paṭṭhāna. If the Paṭṭhāna is criticising the act of giving, holding the precepts, the duty of observance, and the practising of the jhānas, then the Aṭṭhakavagga is criticising knowledge and wisdom. As it is unlikely that either text is critical of practice or knowledge, then it is likely that they are stating that attachment to the path is destructive.

The Aṭṭhakavagga and the Nikāyas are not critical of knowledge and truth but hold that attachment to knowledge and truth is detrimental. The reason that attachment to knowledge and truth is detrimental can be explained by the need for both calm and insight in the process of seeing the true nature of things. I would suggest that, in the same way that action influences knowledge and knowledge influences action, so the texts are describing how calm influences insight, and insight influences calm. In other words, seeing dependent-origination involves being calm, and being truly calm involves seeing dependent-origination.


And here, I suggest, is where Buddhist social engagement must begin. It begins with an attitude free from attachment and stubbornness. Although the Buddha clearly made few prescriptions about how to transform society, he did make many about the adaptation of the mind – and this is the point at which Buddhism might depart from other religious traditions, and depart on a journey of political engagement. The philosophical necessity of non-involvement does not necessarily hinder the efforts by the Buddhist for social and political change – the mind though has to be in the right place for social engagement.



[1] An example of the teaching advising detachment from these means of knowledge in the Aṭṭhakavagga is the following: ‘Giving up old corruptions, not forming new ones, he does not go according to his wishes, he is not a dogmatist. He is completely released from views (and) wise. He does not cling to the world, and does not reproach himself. He is without association in respect of all mental phenomena (dhammas), whatever is seen, or heard, or thought. That sage with burden laid down, completely freed, is without imaginings, unattached, not grasping’ (pubbāsave hitvā nave akubbaṃ, na chandagū no pi nivissa-vādī, sa vippamutto diṭṭhigatehi dhīro, na lippati loke anattagarahī. sa sabbadhammesu visenibhūto, yaṃ kiñci diṭṭhaṃ va, sutaṃ mutaṃ vā, sa pannabhāro muni vippamutto, na kappiyo nūparato na patthiyo ti, Sn 913-14; see also Sn 798, 803, 900; see Gómez, ‘Proto-Mādhyamika’, p 140.

[2] sīlabbataṃ vā pi pahāya sabbaṃ, kammañ ca sāvajjanavajjam etaṃ, Sn 900.

[3] diṭṭhe sute khantim akubbamāno, Sn 897.

[4]kathaṃdassī kathaṃsīlo upasanto ti vuccati, Sn 848.

[5] Sn 849. cf., ‘He for whom there is no state of dependence, knowing the dhamma, is not dependent’ (yassa nissayatā n’ atthi ñatvā dhammaṃ anissito, Sn 856). See also Sn 910: ‘A dogmatist is indeed not easy to discipline, since he prefers a preconceived view. Saying that the good is there, in what he depends upon, he speaks of purity (saying) he saw reality there’ (nivissavādī na hi subbināyo, pakappitaṃ diṭṭhi purekkharāno, yaṃ nissito tattha subhaṃ vadāno, suddhiṃ-vado tattha tathaddasā so, Sn 914).

[6] dhammesu ca na gacchati, Sn 861.

[7] Nett 65.

[8] diṭṭhaṃ, sutaṃ, mutaṃ, viññātaṃ, pattaṃ, pariyesitaṃ, anuvicaritaṃ manasā, S III 203.

[9] The Alagaddūpama-sutta gives the first four khandhas, as noted above.

[10] diṭṭhaṃ sutam mutam viññātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicaritaṃ manasā tam pi: etaṃ mama esoham asmi, eso me attā ti samanupassati, M I 135.

[11] Indeed, I have compared this process to attachment to the khandhas.

[12] S III 203.

[13] Eric Fallick, ‘Two Small Remnants of “Pre-Hīnayānist” Buddhism in the Pāli Nikāyas’, Buddhist Studies Review (17), 2000, 35-38.

[14] anupādinna-anupādāniyā, Dhs 181, § 992.

[15] Cf.: ‘By him not even a minute apperception has been formed here in respect of what is seen, heard, or thought’ (tass idha diṭṭhe va sute mute vā, pakappitā n’ atthi aṇū pi saññā, Sn 802).

[16] ñāṇe pi so nissayaṃ, Sn 800.

[17] diṭṭhim pi so na pacceti kiñci, Sn 800. The term pacceti is translated as ‘believe in’. The term literally means ‘to come on to’; see PED s.v. pacceti.

Buddhism in Burma and Sri Lanka: Ethnocentric Buddhism

Another short interview by Dr David Webster of the University of Gloucestershire with myself, this time about Buddhism in modern Burma. It appears on the University of Gloucestershire’s Video Resources for Philosophy and Religion Students.

I have previously written about the phenomenon of Ethnocentric Buddhism:

‘“Ethnocentric Buddhism” is a term I have begun to use to describe a particular phenomenon in the history of Buddhism, although I suspect it is not a recent one. The term points to the notion that Buddhist identity is intrinsically linked to national identity. It also denotes the idea that other factors will be apparent in creating Buddhist and national identity in different Buddhist cultures. For example, in Thailand there is the idea of “nation, religion and monarch” (chat-sasana-phramahakasat) and in Burma “nation, language and religion” (amyo-barthar-tharthanar). In both of these examples the idea of the Buddhist religion (sasana/tharthanar) is linked to other factors in the formation of national and cultural identity. Further, in both cases the defence of one’s religion is linked to these other themes of national identity — to defend one is to defend the other.’



On Buddhist monks proposing ‘interfaith marriage laws’


There is some debate in Burma about proposed laws that would prohibit interfaith marriage. The laws have been proposed by members of the Burmese Buddhist Sangha. If passed, the laws would prohibit marriage between a Buddhist woman and a man of another faith, unless he ‘converts’ to Buddhism (I am not at all clear of how one ‘converts’ to Buddhism’).

The laws are being proposed on the premise that Buddhism is under threat from other religions. The ‘Interfaith Marriage Act’ is one of the ‘National Race and Religion Protection Bills’ that have been proposed by ‘Organisation for Protection of National Race and Religion’ (OPNRR), headed by Ashin Tilawka Biwuntha. It is clear from the context of the monastic debate that the monks wish to prohibit marriage between Buddhist women and Muslim men – it is then highly discriminatory with undertones of racism and Islamophobia.

There are a few obvious points that should be made about these proposed laws. Buddhism is a monastic tradition – it usually has little concern with secular affairs – and this historically most definitely includes marriage. It is commonplace in Buddhism to observe that there are no Buddhist marriage ceremonies. The monastics might in some ways ‘bless’ a couple after a secular marriage ceremony, and modern Buddhists might have replicated marriage ceremonies from other religions, but it can be stated quite categorically that the Buddhist monastic is not concerned with any type of marriage ceremony. It is this that makes the Burmese monastic debate such an odd phenomenon.

It needs to be stated that, traditionally, the Buddhist monastic is concerned with three things. First, the notion that all actions have consequences; that these actions are causing us to be reborn in an endless cycle of rebirths; and that, given the opportune conditions, the person should strive to end this cycle of rebirths which is pervaded by suffering. In short the monastic is concerned with Karma, Saṃsāra and Nibbāna.

What then is the concern of the monastic with laws prohibiting marriage between different religions? It seems to me that these are the questions that need to be asked by those protesting against the bills proposed by ‘Organisation for Protection of National Race and Religion’. It is reported that some of the monks are disagreeing with various organisations who dare opposed to the Interfaith Marriage Bill, calling overseas NGO’s ‘traitors‘ for their opposition. Clearly, this secular rhetoric is startling in that monastics are debating issues outside of their usual supramundane narrative of traditional Buddhist discourse. The mundane world (lokiya), of secular affairs has become disjointed and mixed with the supramundane world (lokuttara) of Buddhist preaching.


Is the idea that Buddhism has a political message ‘wishful thinking’?


In the study of Buddhism it has often been noted that the teachings do not point to the changing of the world, but to changing our perception of it – there is nothing wrong with the world but the way we perceive the world. The problem of ‘suffering’ (dukkha) is not ultimately to do with the world, but with the fact that people tend to grasp and become attached to all sorts of things. The world is seen with greed, hatred and delusion. This aspect of Buddhist teachings suggests that Buddhist doctrines should not be used to change the world, but to change the way we view the world.They should be used to lessen greed, hatred and delusion and, in so doing, solve the problem of dukkha. What is needed is a way of seeing that reduces and eradicates craving. I would like to consider these ideas and conclude with some comments on how this might affect our understanding of socially engaged Buddhism.

Let me use the Abhidhamma to explore these ideas. Throughout book three of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, an evaluation is given of certain ways of apprehending the world. In the following I would like to focus upon one aspect of what I think the text is describing. Put simply this is that the world can be apprehended with or without craving. This aspect of Buddhist thought has been noted by Steven Collins, who has suggested that this reflects something of a dichotomising tendency within early Buddhism:


‘Anything with conceptual or experiential content was to be assimilated to the impersonal, non-valued side of the dichotomy; since in this sphere everything was dominated by desire and grasping, anything with content became potentially graspable. Against this stood the empty unconditioned nibbāna, susceptible neither to conceptualising nor grasping.’[1]


Buddhism is, at it were, concerened with different orders of seeing, between the graspable, and the ungraspable, between concepts and emptiness, beteen attachment and non-attachment, between craving and calmness. I would like to look at the Dhammasaṅgaṇi to see how it considers this apparent dichotomy. Book three of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi,the Nikkhepa-kaṇḍaṃ, begins with the following question:


‘Which ‘things’ (dhammas. I leave the term untranslated in the following) are wholesome?
The three roots of the wholesome:Absence of greed, hatred and delusion;The four ‘aggregates’ (khandhas)[2] of feeling, apperception, volitional formations and consciousness when they are associated with these roots;Actions of body, speech and mind when they come from these three roots.These are wholesome dhammas’.[3]


With reference to the khandhas, I take this to imply that, when they are seen in their true nature, i.e. as not-self, they are wholesome (this is sammā-diṭṭhi).


The next question asked is:


‘Which dhammas are unwholesome?
The three roots of the unwholesome:Greed, hatred and delusion;The defilements (kilesā) united with them;The four khandhas of feeling, apperception, volitional formations and consciousness when they are associated with these roots;Actions of body, speech and mind when they come from these three roots.These are unwholesome dhammas.’[4]


The Dhammasaṅgaṇi is clearly stating that the four mental khandhas are unwholesome when they are associated with ‘greed’, ‘hatred’ and ‘delusion’ (lobha, dosa, moha). [5] In this analysis it must be remembered that in the Nikāya and Abhidhamma analysis the term khandha is a neutral term, but the khandhas can become associated with (are indeed prone to), corruption. Primarily they are prone to give rise to the corruption of ‘wrong-view’ (micchā-diṭṭhi) which distorts the way things really are. Rupert Gethin has commented on the nature of the khandhas in the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma:


‘The term upādānakkhandha signifies the general way in which the khandhas are bound up with upādāna; the simple khandha, universally applicable, is used in the nikāyas and especially the Abhidhamma texts as a neutral term, allowing the specific aspects of, for example, upādāna’s relationship to the khandhas to be elaborated.’[6]


The Dhammasaṅgaṇi is using the khandhas in its explanation of two ways of apprehending the world, one ‘wholesome’ (kusala), and one ‘unwholesome’ (akusala). These ideas suggest that the text is attempting to explain two attitudes to the world found in the dichotomy suggested by Collins. The same reality is seen, but the one based on non-attachment is wholesome, and the other, based on attachment, giving rise to corruptions, is unwholesome.


One could state that in this particular understanding of the Buddha’s teachings the entire engaged Buddhism agenda appears fundamentally flawed. Socially engaged Buddhism begins with the premise that suffering is not only caused by mental reactions to external events, but that external events – social, political and economic, for example – can be the cause of suffering. For the engaged Buddhist suffering is not only psychological, to be overcome by such techniques as meditation, but finds its causes in a wide variety of factors. Political struggle, among other things, can then be used as a technique to overcome suffering. I’m not suggesting that either interpretation is correct. They appear to me to both be valid and to have support from different parts of the tradition. I would suggest that the teachings I am considering here offer a criticism, and one that perhaps needs to be addressed, of socially engaged Buddhism. As I have heard it suggested – to think that Buddhism has a political message is ‘wishful thinking’.



[1] Steven Collins, Selfless Persons, p. 113.

[2] I shall return to the use of four khandhas below.

[3] katame dhammā kusalā? tīṇi kusalamūlāni: alobho adoso amoho taṃsampayutto vedanākkhandho saññākkhandho saṃkhārakkhandho viññāṇakkhandho, taṃ samuṭṭhānaṃ kāyakammaṃ vacīkammaṃ manokammaṃ, ime dhammā kusalā, Dhs 180, :981. All references to the Dhs are given by page then paragraph numbers.

[4] katame dhammā akusalā? tīṇi akusalamūlāni: lobho doso moho, tadekaṭṭhā ca kilesā taṃsampayutto vedanākkhandho saññākkhandho saṃkhārakkhandho viññāṇakkhandho, taṃsamuṭṭhānaṃ kāyakammaṃ vacīkammaṃ manokammaṃ, ime dhammā akusalā, Dhs 180, :982.

[5] The text finally defines those dhammas that are indeterminate (avyākatā), which is not essential for the present discussion: katame dhammā avyākatā kusalākusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ vipākā kāmāvacarā rūpāvacarā arūpāvacarā apariyāpannā, vedanākkhandho saññākkhandho saṃkhārakkhandho viññāṇakkhandho, ye ca dhammā kiriyā n’ eva kusalā nākusalā na ca kammavipākā, sabbaṃ ca rūpaṃ, asaṃkhatā ca dhātu. ime dhammā avyākatā, Dhs 180, :983.

[6] Rupert Gethin, ‘The Five Khandhas: Their Treatment in the Nikāyas and Early Abhidhamma’, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 14 (1986), 35-53 (p. 39).

Hate speech and ‘flower speech’


The phenomenon of ‘hate speech’ has become synonymous with movements within the Burmese Buddhist Sangha in recent years. Embedded in the rhetoric of the 969 movement and its leader U Wirathu, negative speeches and propaganda aimed at minority groups have tainted the international image if Buddhism in Burma.

Of course, the notion of the purity of speech (vāc) within Indian religious history is very prominent. From the utterance of the sacred scriptures (the Vedas) in the form of mantras, and the precision of Sanskrit grammar to preserve the correct performance of the ritual, to the notion of ‘right-speech’ as part of the Noble Eightfold Path speech is both ontological and ethical. As four of the ‘ten unwholesome courses of action’ (dasa akusala-kammapathā) described as impure and to lead to an unhappy destination, they entail false speech, malicious speech, harsh speech, and gossip. Their opposites, the ‘ten wholesome courses of action (dasa kusala-kammapathā) entails the abandoning of false speech, malicious speech, harsh speech and gossip:

A new movement is growing in Burma called ‘The Flower Speech campaign’ (Panzagar) founded by Nay Phone Latt. The movement embodies many of the elements of the notion of the centrality of speech in Indians religions, and the prominent place that harmonious actions of speech are given on the Buddhist path. This centrality is often overlooked but it is worth considering the attention played to acts of body, speech and mind in Buddhism. Violent acts of the body and a depraved mental attitude are more easily understood, but acts of hatred in the form of speech, preaching, propaganda and education are also powerful tools in the destruction of society and the dismantling of Buddhist culture.

The slogan of the campaign, as described by Nay Phone Latt is ‘Let’s moderate our speech to prevent hatred between human beings’.

As he explains:

‘When we advocate for free speech, reducing hate speech is included. … Speech calling for hitting or killing someone is hate speech, and can spread hate among people and is a risk for society… It is the wrong use of freedom of speech. I am worried about that because it is not only spreading on social media but also by some writers and [Buddhist] monks who are spreading hate speech publicly.’

In the Pali Canon, purity of speech is described in the following terms:

Fourfold cleansing by speech (catubbidhaṃ vācāya soceyyaṃ)

Here someone, abandoning false speech, abstains from false speech; when summoned to a court, or to a meeting, or to his relatives’ presence, or to his guild, or to the royal family’s presence, and questioned as a witness thus: ‘So, good man, tell what you know,’ not knowing he says, ‘I do not know,’ or knowing he says, ‘I know’; not seeing, he says, ‘I do not see,’ or seeing, he says, ‘I see’; he does not in full awareness speak falsehood for his own ends, or for another’s ends, or for the sake of some trifling gain.[1]

Abandoning malicious speech, he abstains from malicious speech; he does not repeat elsewhere what he has heard here in order to divide [those people] from these, nor does he repeat to these people what he has heard elsewhere in order to divide [these people] from those; thus he is one who reunites those who are divided, a promoter of friendships, who enjoys concord, rejoices in concord, delights in concord, a speaker of words that promote concord.[2]

Abandoning harsh speech, he abstains from harsh speech; he speaks such words as are gentle, pleasing to the ear, and loveable, as go to the heart, are courteous, desired by many, and agreeable to many.[3]

Abandoning gossip, he abstains from gossip; he speaks at the right time, speaks what is fact, speaks what is beneficial, speaks on the dhamma and the discipline; at the right time he speaks such words as are worth recording, reasonable, moderate and advantageous.[4]



[1] idha gahapatayo ekacco musāvādaṃ pahāya musāvādā paṭivirato hoti: sabhāggato vā parisaggato vā ñātimajjhagato vā pūgamajjhagato vā rājakulamajjhagato vā abhinīto sakkhipuṭṭho:eh ambho purisa yaṃ jānāsi taṃ vadehī ti. so ajānaṃ vā āha na jānāmī ti, jānaṃ vā āha jānāmī ti, apassaṃ vā āha na passāmī ti, passaṃ vā āha passāmī ti. iti attahetu vā parahetu vā āmisakiñcikkhahetu vā na sampajānamusā bhāsitā hoti, A V 67.

[2] pisuṇaṃ vācaṃ pahāya pisuṇāya vācāya paṭivirato hoti: ito sutvā na amutra akkhātā imesaṃ bhedāya, amutra vā sutvā na imesaṃ akkhātā amūsaṃ bhedāya iti bhinnānaṃ vā sandhātā sahitānaṃ vā anuppadātā, samaggārāmo samaggarato samaggakaraṇiṃ vācaṃ bhāsitā hoti, A V 67.

[3] pharusaṃ vācaṃ pahāya pharusāya vācāya paṭivirato hoti: yā sā vācā nelā kaṇṇasukhā pemanīyā hadayaṅgamā porī bahujanakantā bahujanamanāpā tathārūpiṃ vācaṃ bhāsitā hoti, A V 67.

[4] samphappalāpaṃ pahāya samphappalāpā paṭivirato hoti: kālavādī bhūtavādī atthavādī dhammavādī vinayavādī, nidhānavatiṃ vācaṃ bhāsitā kālena sāpadesaṃ pariyantavatiṃ atthasaṃhitaṃ, A V 267.